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THE HISTORICAL SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND INS v. ST. CYR*
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The Supreme Court's decision in INS v. St. eyri was unusual. Enrico St.
Cyr was the first immigrant in a decade to prevail over the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") at the Court? He was also one of a very few
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I. 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001).
2. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (rejecting challenge to gender discrimination in
naturalization provision); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (approving INS interpretation
of "serious nonpolitical crime provision" of withholding of deportation statute); Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding INS generally does not violate First
Amendment when it engages in selective enforcement of immigration laws based on disfavored
speech or associational activities of non-citizens); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (dismiss-
ing gender discrimination challenge to naturalization statute); INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996)
(approving INS interpretation of "entry fraud" in considering Section 212(h) waiver application);
Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995) (holding that timely filing of motion to reconsider does not toll
ninety-day period for judicial review of deportation orders); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509
U.S. 155 (1993) (rejecting claims that statute and treaty preclude forced repatriation of Haitian
refugees interdicted in international waters); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993)
(vacating injunctions against INS regulations implementing legalization program on ground that
record was insufficient to establish jurisdictional ripeness requirement for judicial review); Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (rejecting challenge by immigrant juvenile detainees to INS regulation
and procedures); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (rejecting challenge to INS interpreta-
tion of political asylum statutory provision); INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992) (rejecting
challenge to refusal to reopen deportation proceedings); INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrant Rights, Inc.,
502 U.S. 183 (1991) (rejecting challenge to INS regulation concerning release on bond of excludable
non-citizens); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991) (holding immigrant who prevails on asylum
application not eligible for award of attorneys' fees under Equal Access to Justice Act); see also
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding concern with foreign prosecution beyond scope
of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable in proceeding to enforce
administrative subpoena regarding possible misrepresentation in immigration application). The last
Supreme Court victory for non-citizens over the INS was McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498
U.S. 479 (1991) (upholding judicial review of class action alleging procedural due process violations
in INS administration of Special Agricultural Worker legalization program).
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habeas petitioners to win before the Court in recent years.3 On an interpretive
level, INS v. St. Cyr is also the rare immigration case in which history seemed
to matter4 and, as Daniel Kanstroom observes in this issue, immigration
law's notorious "plenary power doctrine" did not.5
Although the Court avoided rendering a formal constitutional decision in
holding that 1996 amendments to the immigration statutes had not divested
the federal district courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction to review deportation
orders pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 2241,6 there is little doubt that constitutional
concerns were a compelling consideration for the Court7 and that legal
history played a role in the constitutional analysis of both the majority and
dissenting opinions.8 Somewhat remarkably, Mr. St. Cyr won on the thresh-
old jurisdictional question despite the rejection (in dissent) by the Court's
so-called "originalists" of the judgment of twenty-one legal historians that
"the historical evidence indicates that the statutory interpretation claim raised
by Respondent falls within the scope of habeas corpus at common law."g The
extent to which the Court chooses to invoke history in future immigration or
habeas cases, and whether inquiries into Founding-era materials will work to
the benefit of immigrants or habeas petitioners, remains to be seen.
The Court's historical analysis of the habeas issues drew on the historians'
amicus brief, which is reprinted above. In this Article, we present some of the
historical material regarding habeas corpus review of non-criminal confine-
ment that illuminates the exchange in INS v. St. Cyr majority and dissenting
opinions but which, because of page limitations, we omitted from the brief.
3. There have been many failed habeas petitioners in the past fifteen years. See, e.g., Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence is not
ground for relief on federal habeas petition); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting
challenge on habeas to racially discriminatory application of capital punishment in Georgia). Mr. SI.
Cyr, however, was the second immigrant habeas petitioner in three years to win at the Court. See
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) (claim of Mexican habeas petitioner that he was
incompetent to be executed not barred as "second or successive" petition).
4. Eighteenth-century legal history has not often mattered in the Supreme Court's immigration
cases, perhaps because the Court has resolved so many cases on statutory grounds. See Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century ofPlenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that courts have incorporated basic
constitutional principles into immigration law through statutory interpretation).
5. Daniel Kanstroom, SI. Cyr or Insincere: The Strange Quality of Supreme Court Victory, 16
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 416-17 (2002).
6. INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. CI. 2271, 2287 (2001). In its second holding, the Court also determined
that Congress did not intend the 1996 amendments to apply retroactively to immigrants who pleaded
guilty to criminal charges before the effective dates of the new provisions. Id. at 2293.
7. Id. at 2279 ("A construction of the [habeas jurisdiction] amendments at issue that would
entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would give rise to substantial
constitutional questions.").
8. Compare id. at 2280, 2280 nn.14-23 with id. at 2299,2301-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One
other immigration case that featured some discussion of the history of the Founding era is INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949-51 (1983) (reviewing history of Constitution's presentment and
bicameralism requirements before invalidating one-House veto).
9. Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians at 2-3, INS v. SI. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001) (No.
00-767) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief] (the Brief is reprinted in 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 465 (2002».
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We share as well a few reflections on the debate between Justices Stevens and
Scalia about the relevant legal history and explain why the additional
historical material included below undermines the historical analysis of the
dissent.
I. ADDmONAL HISTORICAL MATERIALS
A. The Habeas Corpus Bill of175810
The difficulties with impressment practices that precipitated Pratt's 1758
habeas corpus billll were explained in newspaper accounts at the time the
bill was proposed. As to who the "commissioners" (the commissioned
impressing officers) captured, The London Chronicle for March 18-21, 1758
observed:
These commissioners do not always confine themselves so strictly to
persons within the description of the act made for that purpose, but that
sometimes, thro' pique or other partial motives, persons of property
have been returned by them to the officers of the crown, who for
security usually commit to the Savoy prison persons so returned, till
opportunity offers to march them to the respective corps in which they
are to serve. 12
And even though such men "have an undoubted right to their habeas corpus,
and many of them have claimed that right, ... it has been said that a rule of
court directed to the commissioners who made the return, and to the keeper
of the Savoy prison, who had the men in custody, to shew cause, was the
readiest way to procure such men their discharge."13 Yet "during the
operation of this new process, the man remains in prison ... ; whereas by the
old law the man's body is immediately to be brought before the court ... ;
and if no legal cause of detainer appears against him, he is to be discharged,
and has his remedy for false imprisonment."14 Worse still, if the man
happened to be taken up in vacation time,15 he could sue out a writ of habeas
corpus, "but that cannot be returnable till the next Sitting of the Court, which
may not, very probably, be till some Weeks after; and, in such Case, how can
he enforce Obedience to the Writ? So that, however contrary to the Direc-
tions of the Act, or however unjustly he may be impressed, he may be sent
10. See generally Barbara W. Kern, The English High Judiciary & the Politics of the Habeas
Corpus Bill of 1758, in LAW AS CULTURE & CULTURE AS LAW 147 (Hendrik Hartog et al. eds., 2000).
11. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 9, at 474.
12. THE LONDON CHRONICLE, Mar. 18-21, 1758, at 273.
13. ld.
14. [d.
15. That is, when the central courts were not sitting. See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 9, at 473
n.12.
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abroad as a Marine before the Writ is returnable."'6
The influential opposition to the bill in the House of Lords by Hardwicke
and Mansfield is mentioned in the brief, but without elaboration. I? Horace
Walpole wrote in his memoirs that Mansfield's speech against the bill was
perhaps "the only speech which in my time at least, had real effect; that is,
convinced many persons.,,18
Ten questions were put by the Lords to the common law judges, and in
response the views of the judges on some points were unanimous or nearly
so; on other points there were divisions. '9 The judges said that, in non-
criminal cases, habeas corpus did not issue as a matter of course, but only on
a showing by affidavit of probable cause; further, such writs could issue
during vacation from a judge of the Court of King's Bench, returnable before
himself (that is, returnable before the single judge, prior to the commence-
ment of the next term when the full court would be sitting)?O Most of the
judges thought that issuance of writs in vacation time, even on a probable
cause showing, was discretionary.21 Most thought that the petitioner had no
remedy against the judge if the judge refused to issue the writ. If the writ
issued in vacation and was not obeyed, the judges were unanimous that
obedience to the writ could not be enforced until the following term, when a
writ of attachment might issue. They uniformly agreed that the 1679 statute
had no application to non-criminal matters.22
Only the tenth question was controversial among the judges: whether the
judges were bound by the facts as stated in the return of the writ.23 This
disagreement related to a provision in the 1758 Bill that a judge who was
considering a habeas corpus writ in a non-criminal matter that had been
returned in vacation time "may and shall ... examine into the facts contained
in such return.,,24
The extensive views of Justice John Eardley Wilmot of the Court of King's
Bench on this provision were printed by his son in 1802 after the judge's
death in Notes of Opinions and Judgments?S Justice Wilmot personally
researched habeas corpus precedents and practices26 and argued that there
16. Letter to the Author, THE LONDON EVENING-POST, Apr. 29-May 2, 1758, at 1.
17. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 9, at 474.
18. H. WALPOLE, 3 MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN OF KiNG GEORGE THE SECOND 120 (1846). For the
reported debate in the House of Lords, see T. C. HANSARD, 15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND
871-926 (1813) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY].
19. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, at 898-903.




24. [d. at 872.
25. J.E. WILMOT, JR., NOTES OF OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS DELIVERED IN DIFFERENT COURTS
105-29 (1802).
26. He even searched for affidavits from Queen Anne's time but discovered that "[t]he Affidavits
were stolen many years ago out of the Office." [d. at 127.
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was no authoritative basis to permit the judges to inquire into the facts by
means of affidavits?7 This, he wrote, would be "confounding the offices of
Judge and Jury"; further, it would deprive the parties of "the benefit of a 'viva
voce' Examination, where the looks, the manner, and deportment of the
witness, are extremely material to confirm or discredit his testimony.,,28
Relying on Wilmot's Notes and Opinions, Holdsworth concluded that the
common law judges were in substantial agreement with Wilmot's views on
the tenth question?9 Yet Holdsworth also noted, without comment on the
apparent inconsistency, that the judges were instructed to draw up a bill
which would clarify the habeas corpus powers of the common law judges
during vacation time and which would, if possible, "give the court power to
inquire into the truth of the return," that the judges prepared such a bill, that
the judges' bill became the foundation of the 1816 Act, and that the 1816 Act
did contain a provision empowering the judge "to inquire into the truth of a
return to the writ.,,30 Why would the judges endorse this provision if they
were in substantial agreement with Wilmot on the tenth question?
There are two responses. First is simply that Holdsworth's conclusion that
there was a consensus among the judges on the tenth question was incorrect.
In fact, on this question, the judges split, six to six.31 Justice Foster, who was
much respected by his brother judges, was strongly in favor of giving the
judges the power to inquire into the facts of the return if circumstances called
for it. In a letter to Chief Baron Parker, he acknowledged the general rule
"that a return to a writ of habeas corpus is conclusive in point of fact," but he
viewed impressment cases as special, and "as they come not within the
general reason of the law, are not within the general rule.,,32 He thought that
if a man who was pressed into service could not controvert the truth of the
facts claimed in the return, "he is absolutely without remedy" as "[a]n
ineffectual remedy is no remedy; it is a rope thrown to a drowning man,
which cannot reach him, or will not bear his weight.'l33 The impressed man
27. Affidavits would have been the only method available to the central court judges to inquire
into the facts without empaneling a jury.
28. WILMOT, supra note 25, at 108-09.
29. W.S. HOLDSWORTH, 9 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 120 (reprint 1966) (1903-1972).
30. [d. at 121-22.
31. In the Parliamentary History, only nine judges' responses are given; five thought the return
could be controverted, and Foster in his letters agreed. R.I. Sharpe suggested that Mansfield was on
the same side because Mansfield thought that existing practice allowed what was provided for in the
bill. R.I. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 66 n.16 (2d ed. 1989). In fact, however, Mansfield in
his private notes squarely states that the judge would be bound by the return. See discussion of this
point infra, text accompanying notes 63-67.
32. M. DODSON, THE LIFE OF SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, Knt. 57-62 (1811) (letter dated May 24,1758).
33. [d. at 60. Among those susceptible to unlawful impressment were apprentices, and there was
another remedy available to them. The Morning Chronicle for May I, 1779 reported a case of an
application for habeas corpus to rescue two apprentices, and:
Lord Mansfield said, that instead of an habeas corpus he should go a shorter way to work, and
grant his warrant for bringing them before him, being apprentices. That he knew not of any
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is taken from the [Stock] Exchange, or from behind his counter, no
matter whence, and thence to the Savoy [Prison], or aboard a tender;
and if his friends happen to have time enough to procure a habeas
corpus, a sufficient return to the writ is immediately made, ... and the
man is sent away, in due form of law, to take his chance, for some years
perhaps, amidst the perils of the sea, and the disasters of war?4
The possibility that the impressed man might "have an action against a man
perhaps not worth a groat [the impressing officer]" was of no practical value,
Foster claimed, especially if in the meantime "plaintiff should be knocked
upon the head in the service.,,35
Chief Baron Parker responded sympathetically but was "afraid that parlia-
ment only can apply a quicker and more effectual remedy."36 Likewise,
Justice Wilmot, responding to the "very hard case ... that a man may be sent
to the West Indies before the falsity of the Return is proved in an Action,"
wrote: "Judges will construe the Law as liberally as possible in favour of
Liberty, but they cannot make Laws; they are only to expound them:
particular Cases must yield to the Law, and not the Law to particular
Cases.,,37
Despite the division among the judges, the bill printed by Foster's
biographer, Michael Dodson, as the judges' bill (which was the model for
the 1816 Act) provided that even when the return of the writ appears to be
"good and sufficient in law," the judge handling the matter "shall ...
proceed to examine into the truth of the facts set forth in such return, and
into the cause of such confinement or restraint, by affidavit, or by
affirmation (in cases where an affirmation is allowed by law), and shall do
therein as to justice shall appertain," and if it should appear doubtful that
material facts in the return were true, the judge was authorized to release
such authority till some years ago, reading some old law books; that he went to Lord
Hardwicke and consulted him on it, who agreed that it was in their power to grant their warrant
in such a case for an apprentice; that Lord Chief Justice Holt was of the same opinion, and that
there were several precedents for it. His Lordship ordered the regular steps to be taken to
obtain the warrant.
MORNING CHRONICLE, May I, 1779, at 3. This practice is also noted in the diary of Mansfield's
predecessor as Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, Sir Dudley Ryder, where it was said to be
"the constant practice" and "not by any statute but by common law." See J. OLDHAM, 1 THE
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 78 n.86
(1992). For a sample of such a warrant, captioned "Judge's Warrant for an Impressed Apprentice" and
issued on April II, 1811, see R. GUDE, 2 THE PRACTICE OF THE CROWN SIDE OF THE COURT OF KING'S
BENCH 371 (1828).
34. DODSON, supra note 32, at 61.
35. [d.
36. [d. at 62-63 (letter dated May 27, 1758).
37. WILMOT, supra note 25, at 121-22.
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the petitioner on bail. 38 This invites the second response to the question of
how the bill came to include the provision. It is likely that the bill was
among Foster's personal papers at his death, inviting in turn the specula-
tion that Foster was the draftsman. If so, given Foster's strong concern
about the impressment cases, he would surely have included the provi-
sion. The judges who disagreed may have let Foster have his way, taking a
"wait and see" attitude, resting secure in the knowledge that if the bill
came forward in the House of Lords, Hardwicke and Mansfield would be
there to straighten it out. By the time the bill surfaced in 1815, of course,
Hardwicke and Mansfield were long gone.
Apart from the question of inquiry into the facts of the return, there
were practical difficulties with the Pratt Bill. The third question posed by
the House of Lords to the judges asked them to explain what effect the
proposed bill would have in practice. This question was withdrawn at the
request of the judges,39 but before it was withdrawn, Lord Hardwicke
wrote out some of his thoughts. He first tried to sort out the structure of
the bill, which partly related back to the 1679 statute and partly set out
new provisions "so mixed together that I have some little doubt about the
extent of the bill.,,40 He concluded that the bill applied not only to the
single judge but also to the full court where the judge sat. For if the bill
were only to apply to a single judge in vacation, that judge "would have a
power of trying the facts contained in the return which the King's
Supreme Courts of Justice could not do," and the subject seeking habeas
corpus would be worse off when the courts were sitting than when they
were not. 41 He then wondered what applicability the bill would have to
soldiers and sailors accused of breaches of military duty, punishable by
courts martial not known when the Act of 31 Car. 2 was passed.42 Further,
the bill would "oblige the person who applies for the writ to pay the
charges," and "if he was so poor as not to be able to pay those charges he
cannot have the benefit of the writ at all.,,43
38. DODSON, supra note 32, at 70. The 1816 Act contains identical language in Section 111.56
Oeo. III, cap. 99, sec. III.
39. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, at 903. In a letter to the Duke of Newcastle on May
22, 1758, Lord Hardwicke relayed "the difficulty made by some of the judges as to answering our
third question," and he laid out various options of how to proceed if the House of Lords, or some of
the judges, were to insist on answers to it. Letter from Lord Hardwicke, to Duke of Newcastle, Add.
MSS 32,880, fols. 192-95 (May 22, 1758) (copy on file with authors).
40. Lord Hardwicke, Hardwicke's Opinion - Habeas Corpus Bill, Add. MSS 35,878, fols. 91
(undated) (unpublished manuscript, copy on file with authors) [hereinafter Hardwicke's Opinion].
41. Id. at fols. 91-95.
42. Id.
43. The author of An Account of the Writ ofHabeas Corpus, printed in the London Magazine for
March 1758, made much of the fact that the 1679 Act was of little use to a poor person who could
neither afford the costs of the writ nor, if in the country, the expense of traveling to London. He
argued that "the liberty even of a poor man" is not "one of those trifles that the law ought to pay no
regard to," and he hoped that Parliament would pass an act enabling the poor to petition "for a Habeas
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Still further, the bill requires an oath of actual confinement, which "will
take away from every father, husband and guardian that right which by the
present practice they now enjoy of compelling the production of a wife[,]
child or ward tho' such child, wife or ward is not actually confined but lives
with any other person by his or her free will and consent.,,44 And under
existing practice, writs "are awarded for wives under some circumstances
upon letters and slight evidence," whereas under the bill an oath is required,
which "will take away this practice.,,45
Hardwicke listed numerous additional problems, one of which was the
question of the truth of the facts averred in the return. According to
Hardwicke, "As the practice now stands, the facts averred in a return must be
taken to be true, till they are disproved by a verdict in an action for a false
return.,,46 But under the bill, "every fact which can be alleged as a justifica-
tion of the confinement or restraint must be tried by the judge before whom
such writs are returnable," yet "he will have no power to convene persons to
be witnesses or to make affidavits," "he can give no costs," "and if he is
mistaken either in law or fact his judgment cannot be controlled by any Writ
of Error, Review, or new trial, but contrary determination upon the same
questions may be made by any of the other judges."47 Indeed, even if all
twelve judges and the Chancellor were to think the facts given in the return as
justification for the confinement were true, the person imprisoned could bring
an action for false imprisonment and take a jury verdict on the same facts,
and if that person won the verdict, the judges and the jurors would be in flat
contradiction "upon the same facts."48
As noted, the other powerful voice opposing the bill was Mansfield, whose
influential speech in the House of Lords was only briefly summarized in the
Parliamentary History and whose answers to the questions to the judges
were never printed. Among surviving manuscripts at Scone Palace, however,
are notes Mansfield made for his speech and in response to the questions.49
Like Lord Hardwicke, Mansfield wrote that "the Writ of Habeas corpus
issues upon the return supposing the facts alleged to be true" and "the merits
of the cause can never be tried upon the Writ."
Mansfield characterized the bill as principally consisting of three proposi-
tions: "That the writ shall peremptorily issue upon the precise grounds stated,
that it shall be governed by a general reference to the provisions in the Act of
corpus in forma pauperis." An Account of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, LONDON MAG., Mar. 1758, at
111,113.





49. Scone Palace MSS, Bundle 1352 (unpublished manuscript, copy on file with authors). All
subsequent Mansfield quotations are from this source.
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31 of Car. 2, and that a single judge privately at his chambers shall examine
the cause without regard to the return." As to the first of these, Mansfield
observed, "The ground upon which it is peremptorily to issue is too straight
and too wide. It is too straight and excludes many cases where the party is
now entitled to a remedy by writ of Habeas corpus."
Take, for instance, the writ as applied to family disputes. Mansfield noted
that the use of the writ in such situations did not become frequent until after
the Restoration, but that at the time he wrote, probable cause in the case of a
lady denied to her relations could be established as simply as by a letter of
complaint from the relatives denied, and even if she sent an affidavit that she
was free, this might be supposed to have been coerced. Yet under the
proposed bill, an affidavit of actual confinement would be required, and the
lady would have to pay the charges for the journey, and she must give bond, if
returned, not to escape. But since a court could not take a wife from her
husband upon a writ of habeas corpus, however ill used she might be by her
husband (all the court can do is to "oblige the husband to give sureties of the
peace"), the "most effectual relief which wives barbarously used by their
husbands get is by escaping."
Under existing practice, Mansfield wrote, a husband whose wife has left
him or a father or guardian whose child or ward is seduced away from him
could get a habeas corpus writ. But under the proposed bill, "he can't
conscientiously make the affidavit required because they are not restrained
but stay away with their own consent."
The ground described by the proposed bill was "too wide," according to
Mansfield, because it "compels the writ peremptorily to issue in many cases
where it ought not, a wife, child, apprentice, articled mariner in the merchant
service, innocently and lawfully restrained, or any person in their behalf with
bad views may obtain the writ and put the party to whom it is directed to great
vexation and expense for which there is no power to give any satisfaction."
Mansfield went on in his notes to describe additional "inconveniences and
absurdities" that could flow from the bill. And, finally, he observed that
criminal matters were already effectively provided for by the 1679 Act, and
the proposed bill attempted "no alteration ... with regard to the Writ of
Habeas corpus in this respect"; thus, "the now Bill ha[d] no relation to
constitutional liberty." Yet "the whole cry is as if it had, and as if it was giving
a further scarcity to that liberty which is confirmed by Magna Carta."
On the first question put to the judges by the House of Lords (whether the
writ should be issuable as a matter "of course, or on probable cause verified
by affidavit"), Mansfield expanded his apprehensions about the bill as
follows:
If the writ issued of course it might be used to bring up infants in the
custody of their guardians, or at the schools where they had placed them
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and poor persons in workhouses or hospitals or in custody of Parish
officers going to be removed to their places of settlement, Soldiers in
prisons, barracks, or Garrisons, Sailors in ships in harbours within any
port of the King's dominions for all these may be considered as under
restraint and confinement. All persons in custody in civil suits, at the
suit of the King, or subject either on mesne process or in execution or
imprisoned by courts of conscience for not paying debts, persons
committed on the Excise Laws for not paying duties. As none of these
can be delivered, there can be no use of bringing them by habeas corpus
but to give them a possibility of escaping.
Mansfield answered the second question (whether in civil cases under
existing law a judge could issue a writ during vacation, returnable before
himself) affirmatively as "the vacation is always considered as part of the
preceding term and it has been the usage from time immemorial to issue all
sorts of writs for commencing suits in the vacation teste50 the last day of the
preceding term." He added, "In cases of custom or prescription (which must
be time out of mind), the usage of the present time and as far back as persons
living can remember is evidence of what the usage has been time out of
mind."
On the tenth question, Mansfield and Wilmot were of like minds.
Mansfield's view was that "[t]he truth of the facts in the return will be
properly determined by a jury, the only legal way I know of determining
controverted facts." He said that if the truth were to be controverted by
affidavits, then surely "the person who makes the return must have an
opportunity of answering them," which could require much time and
expense. Like Wilmot, he argued that "[t]he most probable means of
discovering the truth is the viva voce evidence laid before a jury that by
affidavits is very liable to perjury and misrepresentation." Perhaps
bowing to Foster, Mansfield acknowledged that pressed men stood "on a
particular footing" since the "exigency of public affairs ... makes the
private liberty of individuals give way to the public safety." But he "knew
no principle of law upon which the facts in a return can be controverted in
any manner than by action for a false return."
Against the above background, it is useful to compare in summary form
the statutory regulation of habeas corpus in key provisions of the failed Bill
of 1758 to the bill subsequently drafted by the judges after the 1758 Bill was
rejected and to compare the judges' bill, in tum, to the bill that ultimately
became law in 1816. A comparison of the 1758 Bill with the judges' bill is as
follows:
50. I.e., dated, in the last clause of the writ.
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF ESSENTIAL FEATURES
Subject Failed 1758 Bill Judges' Bill
Reasons for the bill Avoiding delay in issuance of Extending beneficial uses of
writs in non-criminal habeas corpus; avoiding
confinements and ensuring delay
habeas corpus protection in
non-criminal cases
Method and scope Act of 1679, in like manner On complaint made by or
to be extended to on behalf of any person
non-criminal cases; judge confined or restrained in
may be applied to in vacation non-criminal situations,
and may examine into the excepting persons
facts contained in the return imprisoned for debt or by
and into the cause of the process in any civil suit;
confinement or restraint, and writ can issue during
may discharge or bail as vacation on probable cause
justice requires shown by affidavit or by
affirmation; truth of facts
alleged in return can be
examined by single judge in
vacation or by court in term
time
Penalty for Contempt, £200 first time; Contempt, to be heard and
refusing to make a £500 second time, payable to determined by court
return or to bring in party aggrieved
the body
Procedure Writs to be returned the same Writs issued in vacation to
as under the 1679 Act; after be returned the following
general issue joined, special term; writs issued during
matter can be offered by term can be returned in
defendant; if defendant vacation if no time to do so
prevails, can recover costs as before term ends
in ordinary case
Little need be said in comparing the judges' bill to the 1816 Act as the two
were almost identical. According to Bacon s Abridgement, the only differ-
ences lay "in the substitution of a power to arrest and hold to bail by the
warrant of a judge, instead of granting of an attachment by a judge in case of
disobedience; in the omission of powers to grant issues and award costs; in
making no mention of the great seal; and in its extension to Ireland."51
51. M. BACON, 4 A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 147 (7th ed. 1832).
HeinOnline -- 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 496 2001-2002
496 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:485
B. Habeas Review of Civil Confinement in the Colonies
There is widespread agreement that "the common-law writ of habeas
corpus was in operation in all thirteen of the British colonies that rebelled in
1776,"52 but there are almost no reported decisions from the period.53
Nevertheless, there are some indications in materials not previously pre-
sented that the writ was available to non-citizens and to review non-criminal
confinement.
In 1689, for example, residents of Ipswich, Massachusetts gathered and
determined to resist a tax imposed by Governor Edmund Andros without the
approval of the assembly. Reverend Mr. John Wise and "five others of the
principal inhabitants of the town" were arrested and held in the Boston jail
for "contempt and high misdemeanor."54 All six prisoners were "upon
demand, denied the privilege of Habeas COrpUS.,,55 After Chief Justice
Joseph Dudley declared, "Mr. Wise, you have no more privileges left you
than not to be sold as slaves," and informed the jury that he "expected a good
verdict from them, seeing the matter had been so sufficiently proved,"56
Reverend Wise and his colleagues were duly found guilty, sentenced, and
fined.57 Revolutionary pamphleteers later listed the case as "one of the
grievances of the people" against England,58 thus demonstrating the popular
view that the writ of habeas corpus should be available as a remedy for
illegal imprisonment.
Another incident that reveals the power of habeas corpus in the colonies,
and for non-citizens detained in non-criminal confinement, arose from the
British removal of thousands of Acadians to the colonies beginning in 1755.
The Acadians were French Catholic settlers in and around Nova Scotia who
were made "subjects of the Kingdom of Great Britain" when France ceded
sovereignty of the territory to Britain in the 1713 Treaty ofUtrecht.59 Though
subject to British rule, the citizenship status of the Acadians was uncertain,
particularly after the majority of the population refused to swear oaths of
52. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS liS (1980).
53. This is because there were few printed case reports. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 102-03, 322-36 (2d ed. 1985). Also, incarceration was a rare form of post-
conviction punishment in the colonies. Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery,
Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 70 TuL. L. REV. I, 11 (1995).
54. EMORY WASHBURN, SKETCHES OF THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1630-1775, at
105-06 (1840).
55. /d. at 106; see also id. at 116, 195-96; ROLLIN C. HURD, I A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF
PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT 96-97
(reprint 1972) (2d ed. 1876); DUKER, supra note 52, at 101-02.
56. WASHBURN, supra note 54, at 106.
57. [d. at 107.
58. HURD, supra note 55, at 97.
59. NAOMI E.S. GRIFFITHS, THE CONTEXTS OF ACADIAN HISTORY, 1686-1784, at 35 (1992)
(quoting Treaty of Utrecht) [hereinafter GRIFFITHS, HISTORY].
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allegiance to Britain in 1729-30 and again in 1755.60 British authorities and
popular sentiment in the British North American colonies plainly deemed the
Acadians foreigners, consistently referring to them as "French" or, cynically,
as "French neutrals.,,61
In the summer of 1755, during renewed fighting between French and
British forces in the Maritime Provinces, the British determined forcibly to
deport the Acadians from Nova Scotia and to scatter them throughout the
American colonies so as to diminish resistance to British ru1e.62 In a brutal
campaign that eradicated communities and divided families, British authori-
ties drove 5,000 to 7,000 Acadians off their lands, deported them to nine of
the American colonies, and burned their former villages.63 The arrival of
thousands of Acadian refugees in the American colonies also precipitated
numerous local controversies, including debates about restrictions on the
freedom of movement of the Acadians and their dispersal throughout each
colony, appropriate levels of local aid and support, and compulsory binding
ofAcadian children as servants and laborers.64
In some cases, colonial authorities physically detained the Acadians and
contemplated expelling them,65 which raised questions about the availability
of the writ of habeas corpus to the refugees. In South Carolina, for instance,
one of the two colonies to which the most rebellious and potentially
dangerous Acadians were sent, refugees were detained on ships, confined to
Charles Town, and sometimes jailed. In late 1755, after six hundred Acadians
had arrived in Charles Town harbor, Governor James Glen and the Assembly
60. FRED ANDERSON, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR AND THE FATE OF THE EMPIRE IN
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766, at 113 (2000); GRIFFITHS, HISTORY, supra note 59, at 113
(describing uncertainty of Acadian citizenship under law); STEPHEN PLANK, AN UNSETTLED CON-
QUEST: THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PEOPLES OF ACADIA 104, 145 (2001); see also Naomi E.S.
Griffiths, Petitions ofAcadian Exiles, 1755-1785: A Neglected Source, 11 HISTOIRE SOCIALE-SOCIAL
HISTORY 215, 217 (May 1978) (American colonists "had no idea of whether to greet the new arrivals
as prisoners-of-war, subjects of the British Crown temporarily removed from a battle zone,
trustworthy if misunderstood neutrals, or 'intestine Enemies' ") [hereinafter Griffiths, Petitions].
61. GRIFFITHS, HISTORY, supra note 59, at 36 (Acadians were considered "border people of the
English empire" and viewed as "temporarily conquered people" or "prospective British subjects");
PLANK, supra note 60, at 104 (Acadians uniformly referred to as "French").
62. See ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 113-14; PLANK, supra note 60, at 149.
63. ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 114; PLANK, supra note 60, at 149. The largest number of
Acadian refugees were resettled in Massachusetts. PLANK, supra note 60, at 149.
64. See generally GRIFFITHS, HISTORY, supra note 59, at 95-127; PLANK, supra note 60, at 149-57.
65. The frequent resort to detention as a means to control the Acadians is revealed in the saga of
Jacques Maurice Vigneau and his family, who were deported from Acadia to Georgia in fall 1755. The
governor initially refused to allow the refugees to land, keeping them on board their ship at Savannah.
Finally, in response to messages to the governor "warning him that the Acadians were ill and running
out of food," Vigneau and the others were allowed to land and invited to leave the colony with
"passes" to South Carolina. As they struggled north, hoping to return to Nova Scotia, Vigneau and a
group that grew to nearly 100 refugees were detained and eventually released from custody in North
Carolina, New York, and Massachusetts. They finally secured permission to travel to the French
territory of Miquelon in 1763. See PLANK, supra note 60, at 152-53, 156.
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agreed that the refugees should not be received into the colony.66 Upon
investigation, a committee of the Assembly reported that these Acadians had
"borne Arms against his Majesty's Subjects," were devout Catholics, "pro-
fessed an inviolable attachment to the French Interest," and "obstinately
refused to take the Oath of Allegiance."67 The Assembly and Governor
eventually resolved to allow the Acadians to land, but confined them to
Charles Town under guard, with minimal support for their maintenance.68
The financial burden of incarcerating the Acadians, fears prompted by
refugee attempts to escape confinement, and the arrival of still more Acadi-
ans prompted the Governor and Assembly to consider alternatives.69 One
proponent of deporting the refugees invoked habeas corpus, claiming that the
confinement of a small number of dangerous Acadians in the public jail without
warrant was itself unlawful.70 Governor Glen initially determined to have at
least the most dangerous of the Acadians detained in Charles Town "shipped
off" from the colony, but then in early 1756, he reported to the Colonial Assembly
that he had begun to have "some Doubts ... with regard to my power, and the
legality of doing such an Act.'>71 The Governor sought the advice of the
colony's Attorney General, James Wright, and its Chief Justice, Peter Leigh:
both concurred, & are most clearly of Opinion, that I could not: That it
wou'd be illegal, & unwarrantable in acting not only contrary to one of
my Instructions, which I shew'd them, but that it wou'd be a violation
of Magna Charta, The Great Charter of the Land; [&] might subject me
to all the Pains & Penalties in the Habeas corpus Act; Which it is not in
the King's power to pardon. This leaves me no room to doubt that I
shou'd be very wrong, at least for the present, to think any more of such
a dangerous Expedient.72
Rather, the Governor proposed inviting the Acadians to re-settle on islands
off the South Carolina coast, "where little Huts may be put up for them" and
cattle and rice provided, until the Crown directed otherwise "or some legal &
effectual Method be thought of to get clear of them.'.73 The Assembly
66. THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF SOUTH CAROLINA: JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS HOUSE OF
ASSEMBLY, 1755-1757, at xii (Terry W. Lipscomb ed., 1989).
67. /d. at 10. The committee also registered its concern that the Acadians would "have an
opportunity of sowing the seeds of discontent and rebellion among our Slaves" and gathering military
intelligence for the French. /d. at 10-11.
68. /d. at 20-21. Those Acadians who were able were to be put to work, and those of a "turbulent
or seditious Disposition" would be closely confined in the Work House. /d.
69. /d. at xiii-xvii.
70. /d. at xviii (describing argument of William Wragg of South Carolina Council).
71. Message of Royal Governor James Glen to the Commons House Assembly (Feb. 21, 1756),
reprinted in THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF SOUTH CAROLINA: JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS HOUSE OF
ASSEMBLY, 1755-1757, supra note 66, at 120.
72. /d. (emphasis added).
73. /d.
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resolved instead to provide limited support to the Acadians, with instructions
that after fourteen days "the Guards that are placed over them be dis-
charged."74 Eventually Governor Glen acquiesced to efforts to send the most
dangerous Acadians up the coast to North Carolina and Virginia, and in the
summer of 1756, the newly-arrived Governor, William Lyttleton, agreed with
the Assembly on legislation to indenture some Acadians and release others
from Charles Town for resettlement throughout the colony.75 The plain
implication of the South Carolina debate on the fate of the Acadian refugees,
however, is that the writ of habeas corpus was available to non-citizens in the
colonies and to some extent restricted the power of the government to act
against them.
II. REFLECTIONS ON HISTORY IN THE Sr. CYR OPINIONS
It is uncommon for either an immigration case or a habeas case to devote
much attention to eighteenth-century English and American historical pre-
cedent and understandings as nearly all recent immigration and habeas
cases before the Supreme Court have involved questions of statutory construc-
tion rather than constitutional history. But in this immigration habeas case,
the Court's review of the common law history of habeas appears to have
aided it in addressing several questions important in habeas corpus jurispru-
dence.
First, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion expressed the view that the
Suspension Clause "does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence
of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not
(except in case of rebellion or invasion) be suspended."76 Whether the
Constitution guarantees the existence of the writ in the absence of a positive
legislative enactment had lurked as a question at least since Ex parte
Bollman,77 in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "the power to award
the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written
law.,,78 The St. Cyr majority expressly disagreed with Justice Scalia's
interpretation of the Suspension Clause and the Bollman decision,79 however,
74. Message from the Commons House of Assembly to the Governor (Feb. 21,1756), reprinted
in THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF SOUTH CAROLINA: JOU!tNAL OF THE COMMONS HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY,
1755-1757, supra note 66, at 121.
75. THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF SOUTH CAROLINA: JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS HOUSE OF
ASSEMBLY, 1755-1757, supra note 66, at xviii-xxi.
76. INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2299 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. 8 U.S. 75,4 Cranch. 75 (1807).
78. !d. at 94; see also id. at 95 (stating First Congress "must have felt, with peculiar force, the
obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life
and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law
for its suspension should be enacted"); St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2299-2301 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing Bollman).
79. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2281 n.24.
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and even Justice O'Connor declined to join this portion of the dissent,80
apparently settling the question.
Second, the majority rejected the argument of the INS, repeated in Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion, that at common law, "the writ would not issue
where 'an official had statutory authorization to detain the individual.' ,,81
The INS maintained unsuccessfully, therefore, that in a case like St. Cyr, so
long as authorities proffered an explanation for the detention, the writ was
unavailable.82
The Court's review in St. Cyr of the scope of the writ as of 1789 must have
been disorienting to some criminal habeas scholars and practitioners, as
general federal habeas jurisdiction to review the confinement of state
prisoners was provided by statute only in 1867.83 The St. Cyr Court was
careful, however, to preserve a third question, "whether the protection of the
Suspension Clause encompasses all cases covered by the 1867 Amend-
ment,,,84 because the INS's interpretation of the 1996 immigration amend-
ments was inconsistent even with "the writ 'as it existed in 1789.' ,,85
Justice Scalia's dismissal of the early history of habeas corpus is skillfully
deceptive. His argument is built upon the premise that what was at stake was
"the right to obtain discretionary release.,,86 He notes the "apparent credu-
lity" the majority gives to St. Cyr's contention "that there is historical
evidence of the writ issuing to redress the improper exercise of official
discretion."87 He then states that the only early cases "alluded to" by the
majority for this proposition (Ex Parte Boggin88 and Chalacombe's Case89 )
"establish no such thing.,,90 An "exhaustive search of cases antedating the
Suspension Clause discloses few instances in which courts even discussed
the concept of executive discretion," but when they did, they simply
confirmed "that courts understood executive discretion as lying entirely
beyond the judicial ken.,,91 This, Scalia claims, is what one would expect as
"even the executive's evaluation of the facts ... was not subject to review on
habeas."92 Thus, in sum, "there is no authority whatever for the proposition
80. [d. at 2293 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. [d. at 2286 (quoting Brief for INS); 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("And, of course, going
beyond inquiry into the legal authority of the executive to detain would have been utterly
incompatible with the well-established limitation upon habeas relief for a convicted prisoner.").
82. [d. at 2281 ("In this case, the INS points out, there is no dispute that the INS had authority in
law to hold St. Cyr, as he is eligible for removaL").
83. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27,14 Stat. 385.
84. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2279.
85. [d. (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)).
86. [d. at 2301.
87. [d.
88. 104 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1811).
89. [d. n.(a).
90. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2301.
91. [d. at 2302 (citing only Chalacombe's Case).
92. [d.
HeinOnline -- 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 501 2001-2002
2002] THE HISTORICAL SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS AND INS V. ST. CYR SOl
that, at the time the Suspension Clause was ratified ... habeas corpus relief
was available to compel the Executive's allegedly wrongful refusal to
. d' . ,,93exercise IscretlOn.
Missing entirely from Scalia's opinion is the fact that, as the majority noted,
"[t]raditionally, courts recognized a distinction between eligibility for discretionary
relief, on the one hand, and the favorable exercise of discretion, on the other
hand."94 What St. Cyr sought was an order compelling the Attorney General to
give him a Section 212(c) hearing, not an order to compel the Attorney General to
exercise his discretion in St. Cyr's favor.95 The Attorney General had refused
to give St. Cyr a hearing because of a belief that Congressional amendments had
"entirely withdrawn his § 212(c) authority to waive deportation for aliens previ-
ously convicted of aggravated felonies.,,96
As noted, Justice Scalia concluded that there was no authority for the
proposition that habeas could issue "to compel the Executive's allegedly
wrongful refusal to exercise discretion.,,97 It is unclear whether this means
that there is no authority to support the use of habeas to force the Executive
to exercise his discretion regardless of the outcome, or whether it means that
there is no authority for the use of habeas to force the Executive to exercise
his discretion in the petitioner's favor. The latter version appears to have been
the premise with which Justice Scalia began. Yet the "striking proof' that
Justice Scalia offers is the absence of cited authority for the majority's
holding in United States ex ret. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,98 a 1954 Warren
Court decision "that the Attorney General's alleged refusal to exercise his
discretion under the Immigration Act of 1917 could be reviewed on ha-
beas,"99 issued over a dissent that would "leave the responsibility for
suspension or execution of this deportation squarely on the Attorney General,
where Congress has put it."IOO What petitioner complained of in Accardi was
that he was "blackballed" in advance by having been put by the Attorney
General on a list of ''unsavory characters," a list that hearing officers allegedly had
no realistic discretion to ignore. 101 Although petitioner did have a hearing, he
argued that because of the blacklist, it was meaningless. The mlUority agreed
that if Accardi could prove his hearing had been prejudged, then he would be
entitled to a new, fair hearing, one that, nevertheless, might not convince the
93. [d. at 2303.
94. [d. at 2283.
95. Discretion can be abused, of course, and a strong argument can be made that a claimed abuse
of discretion could also be challenged in a habeas proceeding and that this would be within the scope
of Justice Stevens' opinion. On the facts of St. Gyr, it was not necessary to reach this question.
96. St. Gyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2277-78.
97. [d. at 2303.
98. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
99. St. Gyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Accardi, 347 U.S. al271.
101. [d. at 262.
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Attorney General that deportation should be suspended. 102 Although for
different reasons, this is exactly what St. Cyr sought.
A final word concerns the claim by Justice Scalia that the unavailability of
habeas to review the exercise of discretion is logically supported by the
principle that, historically, "the truth of the custodian's return could not be
controverted." 103 As authority, Scalia cited one eighteenth century source and
two modern American law review articles. The one original source was
Wilmot's opinion on the tenth question posed to the judges on the 1758
habeas corpus bill, discussed earlier in this Article. 104 As was earlier
explained, six of the twelve common law judges disagreed with Wilmot's
views, and the bill drafted by the judges, as instructed by the House of Lords,
expressly permitted judicial examination into the truth of the facts alleged in
the return. Moreover, one of the two secondary sources states precisely the
opposite of the proposition for which Justice Scalia offers it. IOS
CONCLUSION
St. Cyr was an important, even landmark, decision in immigration law and
habeas corpus jurisprudence. The INS insisted that no federal court could
review the Executive Branch's resolution of statutory questions relating to
eligibility for discretionary relief, essentially claiming that it is the exclusive
province of the INS to say what the law is. 106 The assertion would have been
striking in any context but was all the more so because St. Cyr involved
Executive Branch detention. Nevertheless, because the case also implicated
discretionary decisions under federal immigration law, discretion exercised
in the shadow of the plenary power doctrine, and because the case concerned
the fate of a man who had pled guilty to a drug offense,107 there was reason to
believe the Court might find the government's arguments attractive.
Precisely why Mr. St. Cyr prevailed on the jurisdictional question is unclear.
Perhaps the Court perceived the Executive Branch's argument for substantial
immunity from judicial scrutiny as an encroachment on its own powers. Perhaps
102. After remand by the Supreme Court, Accardi was ultimately unable to prevail on his claim
that his hearing had been unlawfully prejudged. Shaughnessy v. United States ex reI. Accardi, 349
U.S. 280 (1955).
103. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2303.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
105. Compare Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court - Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 451, 454 n.20 (1966) ("With respect to imprisonment other than for criminal matters, however,
the exceptions to the rule against controverting the return were 'governed by a principle sufficiently
comprehensive to include most ... cases' so that it was 'impossible to specify those [non-criminal]
cases in which it could not [be controverted]' ") (quoting HURD, THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 271 (2d
ed. 1865) (emphasis added)), with St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Oaks,
supra, for proposition that truth of return could not be controverted at common law). Oaks
specifically mentions military impressment cases as ones in which the truth of the return could be
controverted at common law. Oaks, supra, at 454 n.20.
106. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
107. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2275.
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the merits drove the jurisdictional outcome, and the INS overreached when it
demanded the right to remove legal permanent residents from their homes and
families based on a statutory misintetpretation and an old criminal conviction.
Perhaps the international movements for "global constitutionalism" and the "rule
of law" inclined members of the majority toward an outcome that makes it more
difficult for bureaucrats to invade personal liberty based on an arbitrary or
erroneous view of the law. Perhaps the majority simply believed that it is the job of
judges to intetpret the statutes Congress writes, and in this case, Congress did not
make the manifestly clear statement necessary to effect a repeal of habeas corpus
jurisdiction.
But history does appear to have played a role in the outcome. Apart from the
prominence of legal history in the majority's discussion of the constitutional
habeas issues, it is telling that Justice Scalia's dissent fails to join issue with the
substantial evidence that statutory intetpretation claims were within the scope of
review of habeas corpus at common law. This evasion, however much camou-
flaged by the dissent's discussion of the Bollman question108 and its conftation of
eligibility for discretionary relief with the exercise of discretion,l09 suggests that
Justice Scalia had no answer to the historical evidence presented. Forced to pitch
his historical arguments on other grounds, Justice Scalia in effect concedes he
cannot rebut the "substantial evidence ... that pure questions of law like the one
raised by the respondent in this case could have been answered in 1789 by a
common law judge with power to issue the writ ofhabeas cOtpUS.,,110 Even Justice
O'Connor declined to join Justice Scalia's historical analysis. 111
In rejecting the government's analysis, the Court affirmed that the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution requires "some 'judicial intervention in deportation
cases.' ,,112 By concluding that statutory habeas jurisdiction survived, the Court
avoided any need to define the outer boundaries of the scope of habeas corpus
review guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court may not be able, however, to
duck these constitutional habeas questions in future immigration cases. 1I3 Should
the Court face them, its inquiry will be aided by the substantial historical evidence
that at common law the Great Writ was available to non-eitizens to review a wide
range of legal questions regarding non-eriminal confinement.
108. See supra noles 77-80 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2282.
III. Id. at 2293 (0 Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2279 (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953».
113. Congress appears well aware of the St. Cyr clear-statement rule regarding repeal of statutory
habeas corpus jurisdiction to review immigration proceedings. See USA PATRIOT Act of 200 I, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, § 412(b)(2)(A), 115 Stat. 272 (Enhanced Immigration Provisions) (to be codified as 8
U.S.C. § 1226a(b)(2)(A» ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including section 2241 (a) of
title 28 of the United States Code, habeas corpus proceedings described in paragraph (I) may be
initiated only by an application filed with ...").
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